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1. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder societies, political models and even electronical applications can be descri-
bed by means of weighted majority games, which can be modified if the weights and/or
the quota which define them are modified.
For instance, the increase of capital in a shareholder society makes investors to increase
or decrease their shares, at the same time that it provokes a change of the quota to adapt
it to the new situation, previous consensus. To assure that the new distribution does
not interfere in the fight for the control of the company it is necessary to estimate the
maximum percentage in the variations of weights and quota which leave invariant the
game associated to the initial situation.
Analogously, in the realization of a linearly separable switching function by means of
an electronic device, the components used to fix the weights and the threshold cannot
be completely accurate. Hence, in determining the required accuracy of these compo-
nents, it is necessary to estimate the maximum percentage errors in the weights and the
threshold which may be allowed without disturbing the function to be realized.
In the reliability of systems it is interesting to know which subsets of components make
an additive system to work when these subsets work, and which of them make the
system to fail when all of them fail. The additive system is characterized by the weight
of each component and the threshold of fail. This problem can be naturally transferred
to the game theory. To do this it is only necessary to consider the components as players,
and the subsets of components as coalitions. So, the additive reliability systems become
weighted majority games.
In this paper we start from the tolerance, solution obtained by Hu in the resolution of
this problem assigned to the field of electronics, and we improve it from the amplitude
when we transfer such a problem to the field of game theory.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we explain the basical definitions that
permit the pursuit of the work. In Section 3 we summarize the results on tolerance
obtained by Hu and, at the same time, we improve them. In Section 4 we define the
amplitude for strict representations of weighted majority games, which will be the ma-
ximum percentage in the variation of the weights and the quota which leave the game
unchanged. As an immediate consequence we deduce that such a value improves the
tolerance. In Section 5 we obtain the simplified expression for the amplitude for strict
representations of monotonic weighted majority games. Section 6 is devoted to find the
quota which allows us to find the maximum value for the amplitude when the weights
are given. Finally, Section 7 includes two examples to illustrate the preceding results.
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2. BASIC NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Let Q be the set f0; 1g: For any given positive integer n, consider the cartesian power
Q
n
= Q    Q:
Thus, the elements of Qn are the 2n ordered n-tuples
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
):
By a switching function of n variables, we mean a function
f : Q
n
Q
from the n-cube Qn into Q:
A switching function f : Qn Q is linearly separable if it admits a system
[T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]
such that for an arbitrary point
x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)
of the n-cube Qn we have
w
1
x
1
+   + w
n
x
n
 T; if f(x) = 1
w
1
x
1
+   + w
n
x
n
< T; if f(x) = 0:
The n real numbers w
1
; : : : ; w
n
in this system are called the weights, and the first real
number T is referred to as the threshold or quota.
It is always possible to modify the quota in such a way that the previous definition could
be rewritten using strict inequalities. In this case, the system is called a strict separating
system for the linearly separable function f:
We will see the way in which we can transfer this concept to the field of game theory.
A simple n-person game is a pair (N; v) where N is described as N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng
and is called the set of players. Every S  N is a coalition, C(N) is the set of all
coalitions and v : C(N) f0; 1g such that v(;) = 0 is the characteristic function.
We will suppose that v is not identically equal to zero. A coalition S is winning if
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v(S) = 1 and losing o therwise. The set of winning coalitions is denoted byW and the
set of losing coalitions by L:
A simple game (N; v) is a weighted majority game iff there are real numbersT;w
1
; : : : ;
w
n
such that v(S) = 1 if w(S)  T and v(S) = 0 otherwise, where w(S) =
P
i2S
w
i
.
Then [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] is called a representation of the weighted majority game (N; v):
If T is such that v(S) = 1 ifw(S) > T and v(S) = 0 ifw(S) < T , then [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]
is called a strict representation of (N; v):
As is obvious, every weighted majority game admits a strict representation.
From v(;) = 0 it is clear that T > 0:
A simple game is monotonic if all subcoalitions of the losing coalitions are losing. If
each proper subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this winning coalition is called
minimal. It should be noted that a monotonic simple game is completely determined
by its minimal winning coalitions. The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted by
W
m
: For monotonic simple games a player i 2 N is null if i =2 S for all S 2 Wm: In a
weighted majority game, we will denote by D the set of null players with non-positive
weight (if any).
Throughout this paper, let [T ;w
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
n
] be a strict representation of a weighted
majority game.
Formally, a switching function f with f(0; : : : ; 0) = 0 is equivalent to a simple game
and a strict separating system is a strict representation of a weighted majority game
without condition T > 0:
Gambarelli (1983) studied the effects on the game when a player increases his weight
in perjudice of others, or decreases in favour. This situation can be generalized in case
that there exist variations in each one of the weights and the quota, which is what we
want to study. Carreras (1993) studied the effects on the Shapley value of a weighted
majority game in which weights are given and the quota is modified. He particularly
studied those effects on the European Parliament. These two articles have a relation
with our paper in the sense that in both of them we can see variations either in weights
or in the quota.
3. TOLERANCE
Throughout the section, let f : Qn Q be an arbitrarily given linearly separable
switching function of n variables and let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a given strict separating
system for f:
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For each point x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) in Qn; let
w(x) = w
1
x
1
+   + w
n
x
n
:
Then it follows from the definition of a strict separating system that
w(x) > T; if f(x) = 1;
w(x) < T; if f(x) = 0:
Let A denote the maximum of the function w(x) for all x 2 f 1 (0) and let B denote
the minimum of the function w(x) for all x 2 f 1(1): If f 1(0) is empty, we set
A =-1; if f 1(1) is empty, we set B =1: Then we have A < T < B.
Adapting the definitions for strict representations of weighted majority games we have
the following results.
Let A denote the maximum of w(S) for all S 2 L and let B denote the minimum of
w(S) for all S 2 W . Then, we have A < T < B and A  0:
Now let m denote the smallest of the two positive numbers T   A and B   T: On the
other hand, let
M = T + jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j :
Let 
1
; : : : ; 
n
and  be n+ 1 arbitrary real numbers and let
w
0
i
= (1 + 
i
)w
i
i = 1; : : : ; n
T
0
= (1 + )T:
Then, the real numbers 
1
; : : : ; 
n
and  represent the relative variations if we use
the numbers w0
1
; : : : ; w
0
n
and T 0 instead of the original numbers w
1
; : : : ; w
n
and T as
weights and quota. In this paper we are going to find the maximum of those positive
real numbers  such that if
jj < ; j
i
j <  i = 1; : : : ; n
then [T 0 ;w0
1
; w
0
2
; : : : ; w
0
n
] is still a representation to the given game. Such a positive
real number  was given by Hu (1965) for strict separating systems. He defined the
number m
M
(taking jT j in M instead of T ), which is completely determined by the set
of real numbers [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]:
Theorem 3.1. (Hu, 1965) Let f : Qn Q be an arbitrarily given linearly separable
switching function of n variables and let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a given strict separating
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system for f. If j
i
j <
m
M
for each i=1, : : : , n and if jj < m
M
, then [T 0 ;w0
1
; : : : ; w
0
n
] is
a strict separating system for the given linearly separable switching function.
He called this positive number the tolerance of the system and denoted
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] =
m
M
:
Theorem 3.2. (Hu, 1965) Let f : Qn Q be an arbitrarily given linearly separable
switching function of n variables and let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a given strict separating
system for f. Then:
a)  [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]  1:
b)  [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]   [C;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]; where C stands for A+B
2
: If T 6= C the
inequality is strict.
Adapting Hu’s results for strict representations of weighted majority games we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a strict representation of a weighted majority
game. Then
a)  [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]  1:
b)  [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]   [C;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]; where C stands for A+B
2
: If T 6= C the
inequality is strict.
Our main objetive is to find the greatest value for  such that if
jj < ; j
i
j <  i = 1; : : : ; n
then [T 0 ;w0
1
; : : : ; w
0
n
] is still a representation to the given game. We will distinguish
the monotonic case from the non-monotonic case.
First we will see how the bound given by Hu for the tolerance can be improved when
we are restricted to strict representations of weighted majority games.
Theorem 3.4. Let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a strict representation of a weighted majority
game. Then,
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] 
1
3
.
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Proof: From Theorem 3.3 the tolerance reaches its maximum when T is the arithmetic
mean
T =
A+B
2
of the real numbersA and B: Then it follows that m = B A
2
and M = A+B
2
+ jw
1
j+
  + jw
n
j : Due to the fact that v is not identically equal to zero it exists a coalition S
such that w(S)  B and, consequently, jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j  B:
Theorefore, we obtain
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] =
m
M

B  A
2
A+B
2
+ jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j


B  A
A+B + 2B

B
A+ 3B

1
3
:

The following result proves that 1
3
is reached and it characterizes the strict representa-
tions of monotonic weighted majority games which reach it.
Proposition 3.5. The set of strict representations of monotonic weighted majority ga-
mes with tolerance 1
3
is
[T ; 2T; 0; : : : ; 0]:
Proof: Let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a strict representation of a weighted majority game. Its
tolerance is:
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] =
m
M
where m = minfT  A;B   Tg and M = T + jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j :
We want to determine which are the strict representations of monotonic weighted ma-
jority with tolerance 1
3
.
From Theorem 3.3 we must consider T = A+B
2
:
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 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] =
B  A
A+B + 2(jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j)
=
1
3
,
B   2A = jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j :
Because jw
1
j+  +jw
n
j  B andA  0, we obtain thatA = 0 and jw
1
j+  +jw
n
j =
B:
Therefore from A = 0; B = 2T and jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j = 2T , we can deduce that the
game is:
[T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]  [T ; 2T; 0; : : : ; 0]:

For the set of non-monotonic games this maximum is smaller.
Theorem 3.6. Let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a strict representation of a non-monotonic weigh-
ted majority game. Then,
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] 
1
5
:
Proof: The tolerance reaches its maximum when
T =
A+B
2
:
Then it follows that m = B A
2
and M = A+B
2
+ jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j. Due to the fact that
the game is non-monotonic there exist coalitions R  S such that v(R) = 1, v(S) = 0
and w
i
< 0 8i 2 S  R. Hence,
X
i2R
w
i
 B and
X
i2S
w
i
 A;
and therefore
X
i2S
jw
i
j =
X
i2R
jw
i
j+
X
i2S R
jw
i
j  B + (B  A) = 2B  A:
We obtain
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] =
m
M

B A
2
A+B
2
+ jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j

B  A
A+B + 2
P
i2S
jw
i
j

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B  A
A+B + 2(2B  A)
=
B  A
5B  A

1
5
:

Analogously to Proposition 3.5, we characterize the strict representations of non-mo-
notonic weighted majority game with tolerance 1
5
:
Proposition 3.7. The set of strict representations of non-monotonic weighted majority
games with tolerance 1
5
is
[T ; 2T; 0; : : : ; 0; 2T ]:
Proof: Let [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] be a strict representation of a non-monotonic weighted ma-
jority game. We want to determine which representations of this type have tolerance
1
5
.
From Theorem 3.3 we must consider T = A+B
2
:
 [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] =
B  A
B +A+ 2(jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j)
=
1
5
,
2B   3A = jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j :
In the proof of Theorem 3.6 we showed that jw
1
j +    + jw
n
j  2B   A; and since
A  0 we obtain that A = 0 and jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j = 2B:
Therefore from A = 0; B = 2T and jw
1
j+   + jw
n
j = 4T we can deduce that:
[T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]  [T ; 2T; 0; : : : ; 0; 2T ]:

4. AMPLITUDE FOR STRICT REPRESENTATIONS OF WEIGHTED
MAJORITY GAMES
Our main objetive in the present section is to find, for strict representations of weighted
majority games, the greatest positive real number  such that if
jj < ; j
i
j <  i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
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then [T 0 ;w0
1
; : : : ; w
0
n
] is equivalent to [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]:
We will call this constant amplitude of the representation and we will see that it is
the maximum of rate one in the variation of weights and in the quota, so as the game
remains invariant. As the tolerance provides a bound which guarantees that the game
remains invariant, the tolerance has to be smaller than, or equal to, the amplitude.
Given a strict representation of a weighted majority game [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
], for each
coalition S  N let
a(S) = jw(S)   T j
b(S) = T +
P
i2S
jw
i
j :
Note that these are positive numbers. Take
P = min
SN
a(S)
b(S)
:
We call this number the amplitude of the representation [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] and denote
[T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] = P:
The minimum P is attained for, at least, some coalition, namely from now on S
0
:
Theorem 4.1. If j
i
j < P for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and jj < P , then [T 0 ;w0
1
; : : : ; w
0
n
]
is equivalent to [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] and P is the greatest upper bound for the constants

1
; : : : ; 
n
;:
Proof: First of all, we observe that, from the definition, P < 1 and because
T
0
= (1 + )T; if jj < P we obtain that T 0 > 0:
For each coalition S  N , let
w
0
(S) =
X
i2S
w
0
i
.
For the first part it suffices to prove that w0 (S) > T 0 for every S 2 W and w0(S) < T 0
for every S 2 L:
First, let us assume that S 2 W : Then we have
a(S) = w(S)  T .
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By definition of w0 (S), we have
w
0
(S)  T
0
=
P
i2S
w
0
i
  T
0
=
P
i2S
(1 + 
i
)w
i
  (1 + )T = [w(S)  T ]+
+[
P
i2S

i
w
i
  T ]:
Since w(S)  T = a(S) and





X
i2S

i
w
i
  T






X
i2S
j
i
j jw
i
j+ jjT < P [
X
i2S
jw
i
j+ T ] =
a(S
0
)
b(S
0
)
b(S)  a(S);
it follows that w0(S)  T 0 > 0 and hence w0 (S) > T 0 :
Next, let us assume that S 2 L: Then we have
a(S) = T   w(S) .
As above, we have
T
0
  w
0
(S) = (1 + )T  
X
i2S
(1 + 
i
)w
i
= [T   w(S)] + [T  
X
i2S

i
w
i
]:
Since T   w(S) = a(S) and





T  
X
i2S

i
w
i





 jjT +
X
i2S
j
i
j jw
i
j < P [T +
X
i2S
jw
i
j] =
a(S
0
)
b(S
0
)
b(S)  a(S)
it follows that T 0   w0(S) > 0 and hence w0 (S) < T 0 .
For the second part we will suppose Q > P , and then we will demonstrate that the
game given by
[T (1 + ); (1 + 
1
)w
1
; : : : ; (1 + 
n
)w
n
]
is not equivalent to [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] for all  and 
i
with jj < Q and j
i
j < Q for
each i = 1; : : : ; n:
Let S
0
 N such that a(S0)
b(S
0
)
= P: If S
0
2 W , taking
 =  and 
i
=

  if w
i
 0
 if w
i
< 0
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with P <  < Q, we will obtain a contradiction concerning S
0
.
w
0
(S
0
)   T
0
= [w(S
0
)   T ]   [T +
P
i2S
0
jw
i
j] = a(S
0
)   b(S
0
) < a(S
0
)  
a(S
0
)
b(S
0
)
b(S
0
) = 0
and hence S
0
=2 W .
Analogously, is S
0
2 L, taking
 =   and 
i
=

 if w
i
 0
  if w
i
< 0
with P <  < Q, we will obtain a contradiction concerning S
0
.
T
0
  w
0
(S
0
) = [T   w(S
0
)]   [T +
P
i2S
0
jw
i
j] = a(S
0
)   b(S
0
) < a(S
0
)  
a(S
0
)
b(S
0
)
b(S
0
) = 0
and hence S
0
=2 L.
As a consequence of the maximality of the amplitude, we can deduce that the tolerance
is smaller than, or equal to, the amplitude.
5. AMPLITUDE OF MONOTONIC WEIGHTED MAJORITY GAME STRICT
REPRESENTATIONS
When we are restricted to strict representations of monotonic weighted majority ga-
mes, the weight of each no null player is positive (we only have to compare a minimal
winning coalition, which possesses this no null player, with the same coalition without
him; the resulting inequality tells us the weight must be positive). Thus, a weight may
only be non-positive if it belongs to a null player. Taking into account these facts, for
monotonic games we are going to find a simpler expression for the amplitude.
Theorem 5.1. If [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] is a strict representation of a monotonic weighted
majority game with amplitude P , then
P = min

B   T
B + T   2w(D)
;
T  A
T +A

where D is the set of null players with negative weight (if any).
54
Proof: First we are going to demonstrate that
P  min

B   T
B + T   2w(D)
;
T  A
T +A

:
Taking into account that P = min
SN
a(S)
b(S)
, it suffices to prove for S 2 L that
a(S)
b(S)

T  A
T +A
and for S 2 W that
a(S)
b(S)

B   T
B + T   2w(D)
:
For this purpose we have to check for S 2 L that
2AT +A
 
X
i2S
jw
i
j   w(S)
!
  T
 
X
i2S
jw
i
j+ w(S)
!
 0:
Since
P
i2S
jw
i
j w(S) =  2w(S\D);
P
i2S
jw
i
j+w(S) = 2w(S D) and by definition
of null player w(S  D)  A, it follows that
2[T (A  w(S  D)) Aw(S \D)]  0:
Next, let us assume that S 2 W . Then, taking into account
P
i2S
jw
i
j   w(S) =
 2w(S \D) and
P
i2S
jw
i
j+ w(S) = 2w(S  D), we have to check
2[ BT + Tw(D)  w(D)w(S) +Bw(S \D) + Tw(S  D)]  0:
Regrouping terms it is clear that we have to check
2[T (w(D) + w(S  D) B)  w(D)w(S) +Bw(S \D)]  0:
Taking into account w(S)  B, it is enough to check
2[T (w(D) + w(S  D) B) +B(w(S \D)  w(D))]  0:
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The first member of the sum is positive because for any winning coalition S we have
that (S   D) [ D is also winning: The second member of the sum is non-negative
because w(S \D)  w(D): So, it is clear that:
2[T (w(D) + w(S  D) B) +B(w(S \D)  w(D))]  0:
Therefore,
P  min

B   T
B + T   2w(D)
;
T  A
T +A

:
Now, we are going to demonstrate that P  min
n
B T
B+T 2w(D)
;
T A
T+A
o
:
Let S
0
2 W be such that w(S
0
) = B: Then D \ S
0
= D and
P = min
SN
a(S)
b(S)

a(S
0
)
b(S
0
)
=
B   T
T +B   2w(D)
:
Let S
0
2 L such that w(S
0
) = A: Then D \ S
0
= ; and
P = min
SN
a(S)
b(S)

a(S
0
)
b(S
0
)
=
T  A
T +A
:
Therefore,
P  min

B   T
B + T   2w(D)
;
T  A
T +A

:

Shareholder societies and most models in political science can be described by specif-
ying non-negative weights for the voters and a positive quota. These situations give rise
to w(D) = 0 and therefore the amplitude is P = min
n
B T
B+T
;
T A
T+A
o
:
Notice that from the definition of P the amplitude satisfies 0 <  < 1, and for each
number x 2 (0; 1) it exists a 2-game
"
1 + x
1  x
;

1 + x
1  x

2
; 1
#
whose amplitude is x:
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6. MAXIMUM AMPLITUDE
In this section we want to determine the maximum value that the amplitude for a strict
representation of a weighted majority game can reach, when the weights of players are
invariable.
For a given strict representation of a weighted majority game [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
], the quota
T may be any real number between A and B. Let us suppose A > 0; this is,
0 < max
S2L
w(S) = A < T < B = min
S2W
w(S):
We define the function
f(S; T ) =
a(S; T )
b(S; T )
if S  N and T 2 (A;B),
where a(S; T ) = jw(S)  T j, b(S; T ) = T +
P
i2S
jw
i
j and let
F (T ) = min
S2L
f(S; T );
G(T ) = min
S2W
f(S; T ):
Then f(S; T )  1 , and using A > 0 it follows that F (T ) < 1:
It turns out that the amplitude [T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] reaches its maximum when T is the
unique number such that
F (T ) = G(T ):
Precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. For every strict representation of a weighted majority game
[T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
] with 0 < A < T < B we have
[T ;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]  [T

;w
1
; : : : ; w
n
]
where T  stands for the unique number such that F (T ) = G(T ): If T 6= T  the ine-
quality is strict.
Proof: For every coalition S, the function f(S; T ) is continuous and derivable with
respect to T in (A;B), and consequently F (T ) and G(T ) are continuous too. Fixing
S; the derivative of f(S; T ) with respect to T is
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Pi2S
jw
i
j+ w
i

T +
P
i2S
jw
i
j

2
 0 if S 2 L,
 
P
i2S
jw
i
j+ w
i

T +
P
i2S
jw
i
j

2
< 0 if S 2 W .
Then, F (T ) is a nondecreasing function and G(T ) is a strictly decreasing function. To
obtain T 2 (A;B) which defines the maximum amplitude for the given representation,
we consider the function
P (T ) = minfF (T ); G(T )g for A < T < B
and we demonstrate there is just one number T  which reaches the max
T2(A;B)
P (T ): The
uniqueness is due to the above considerations about nondecreasing behaviour of F and
decreasing behaviour of G: The existence can be proved using Bolzano’s Theorem:
lim
T B
 
F (T ) G(T ) = lim
T B
 
F (T ) > 0
and due to the fact that A > 0, it follows that lim
T A
+
F (T ) = 0: Then
lim
T A
+
F (T ) G(T ) = lim
T A
+
 G(T ) < 0 :

In particular, for monotonic games the amplitude P = min
n
B T
B+T 2w(D)
;
T A
T+A
o
rea-
ches its maximum when B   T
B + T   2w(D)
=
T  A
T +A
and therefore
T =
w(D) +
p
(w(D))
2
+ 4AB   4Aw(D)
2
:
If w(D) = 0; T is the geometric mean of the real numbers A and B:
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7. APPLICATIONS
To illustrate the ideas of this paper, two examples of amplitude of strict representations
of weighted majority games are presented.
Example 7.1. A town signed a biannual agreement with three gas companies, X, Y and
Z for which the supply of gas to the town is guaranteed by the collaboration of at least
two of them. The first year the needs of the town were of 75 Km3; and each one of the
firms offered a fixed quantity of 60 Km3, 30 Km3 and 60 Km3, respectively.
This situation can be described by the strict representation of the weighted majority
game
[75; 60; 30; 60].
As it can be seen any coalition made by two or more of the firms is sufficient for the
town needs, that’s to say: Wm = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg and A = 60; B = 90:
Apart from the coalition formed, the amplitude of the representation is
 = min

T  A
T +A
;
B   T
B + T

=
1
11
:
From this, we can assure that for the second year, bearing in mind that the town neces-
sities and the disponibilities of the companies will slightly vary, we can describe this
situation as follows:
[75(1 + ); 60(1 + 
1
); 30(1 + 
2
); 60(1 + 
3
)].
From the amplitude which we obtain, we can assure that the maximum percentage of
such variations is a 9:09% so as to guarantee the fulfilment of the agreement.
But, if we had used the tolerance,  = 1
15
, the maximum estimated percentage in the
possible modifications would have been just of a 6:66%:

Example 7.2. We suppose that a shareholder society is formed by three majority sha-
reholders (each one of them has respectively 50.000, 25.000 and 25.000 shares) and an
ocean of small shareholders which possess a total of 5.000 shares. A bill of the com-
pany is passed if the sum of the shares belonging to the holders which vote in favour
is more than 60.000 shares. It can be foreseen that at the end of the year there will be
a variation of the capital which will affect the distribution of the actions as well as the
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quota. If we exclude the possibility of the entry of new investors, the situation can be
described with the following game:
[60000(1 + ); 50000(1 + 
1
); 25000(1 + 
2
); 25000(1 + 
3
); w
4
(1 + 
4
); : : : ;
w
n
(1 + 
n
)];
where the subindices 4, : : : , n represent the smaller players,
n
P
i=4
w
i
= 5:000 andw
i
> 0
for i = 4; : : : ; n:
As the amplitude is 1
23
, any variation such as jj < 1
23
; j
i
j <
1
23
for each
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, assures that the process of taking decisions in the company will not
vary.
For example, the distribution
[62:500; 47:916; 26:041; 23:958; w
4
(1 + 
4
); : : : ; w
n
(1 + 
n
)]
represents the same situation as the first game.

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